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Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate:
China and International Climate Policy Beyond Kyoto
Dr. jur. Christoph Holtwisch, M.Env.Sc.1
Abstract
The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate [APP] of Australia, China,
India, Japan, South Korea, USA and their new partner Canada is a new phenomenon in
international climate policy and open for enlargement by other interested states. This nonlegally binding sustainable development Partnership connects climate protection and energy
security for the first time in an international agreement. As a potential framework for the
other 'parallel tracks' to the UN climate regime of Framework Convention on Climate Change
[FCCC] and Kyoto Protocol [KP], the APP – which is still by far underfinanced – at its core
is a political agreement for the development and transfer of environmentally-sound
technologies. The Partnership intends only relative emission reductions and contains no
binding emission reduction commitments.
Officially, the APP is consistent with the principles of the FCCC and intended to
complement but not replace the KP. Nevertheless, the APP is only one of the partnerships
embodied already in the FCCC technology framework and, therefore, no complement. The
APP was intended as an opposing model against the KP and will have to clarify its position
for the future. A fruitful cooperation or at least a peaceful coexistence with the UN climate
regime is important because every technology-orientated approach needs market incentives.
Any international Post-2012 climate change regime will have to combine the as yet
competing approaches of market pull (KP) and technology push (APP). Integrating also
climate change and energy security concerns is especially important for Asia as a region with
a strong economic growth and the APP is a forerunner in this. China plays an especially
important role, of course.
The third ministerial meeting of the APP will take place in China in 2009.
1. Introduction
The Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate [APP] is a relatively new
phenomenon in international climate policy. In its own view, the Partnership is a grouping of
key nations (or: players) to address various serious and long-term challenges, including
anthropogenic climate change and energy security. It contains the first connection of the two
important aims of climate protection and energy security in an international agreement and
focuses on the Asia-Pacific region. The Partnership founding partners of Australia, China,
India, Japan, South Korea, and the USA and their new partner Canada represent more than
half the world's economy and population, energy consumption and global greenhouse gas
emissions. For that reason, this 'coalition of the emitting' is and will be an essential factor in
international climate policy. For China, it is an important part of its climate policy within the
wider strategy of 'peaceful development'.
2. Development and Enlargement
After secret negotiations, the APP was announced on 28th of July 2005 at an ASEAN
regional forum in Vientiane, Laos, at which time a Vision Statement was released. The
official creation of the Partnership occurred at an inaugural ministerial meeting on 12th of
January 2006 in Sydney, Australia. Here, the APP Charter was launched, accompanied by a
Communiqué and a Work Plan. The Vision Statement is now an integral part of the Charter.
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The first meeting of the Policy and Implementation Committee [PIC] of the
Partnership took place from 18th to 21st of April 2006 in Berkeley, California, in the USA.
This first meeting produced Guidelines for the Task Forces of the Partnership and for their
Action Plans. At the second PIC meeting, held in Jeju, Korea, from 11th to 13th of October
2006, additional Guidelines for flagship projects were made. The Action Plans developed by
the Task Forces were also accepted at this time by the PIC. On 4th of April 2007, further
Guidance to the Task Forces and a Procedure for Adding New Projects to the Partnership
were published. The third PIC meeting took place in Tokyo, Japan, from 19th to 20th of July
2007. It produced the Forms for Project Registration and Status Report already foreseen in
the Procedure and the Guidance. The third PIC meeting also prepared for the second
ministerial (and fourth PIC) meeting of the Partnership, which took place on 15th of October
2007 in New Delhi, India.
At the New Delhi meeting, the ministers released a second Communiqué. Therein, the
Partners state that while the climate change, clean development, and energy security
challenges they face are considerable, they have pioneered an innovative partnership focusing
on practical solutions and have accomplished much in a relatively short time. This
communiqué was accompanied by a flagship projects Brochure and the launch of an 'AsiaPacific Energy Technology Cooperation Centre'. The brochure is meant to exemplify the
different types of cooperative activities being undertaken by the Partners – these flagship
projects are selected to tell and illustrate the broader story of the whole APP. The centre is
expected to provide benefit to the Partnership by enhancing the sharing, dissemination of
energy efficiency knowledge, and best practices that exist in the governments and industries
of the Partner countries, through workshops, train-the-trainer programs and an information
database.
The enlargement of the APP with the addition of Canada was also announced at the
second ministerial meeting in New Delhi. The ministers decided to meet again in 2009 in
China, with the PIC continuing with its work in the meantime. Its fifth meeting took place in
Seattle, USA, from 19th to 20th of May 2008; there, Canada was welcomed as the Co-chair
for the Cement Task Force. The sixth PIC meeting took place in Vancouver, Canada, from
29th to 30th of October 2008. Both meetings did not produce new important documents. The
seventh PIC meeting was held from 19th to 20th of May 2009 in Gold Coast, Australia and
was among other things intended to discuss the future of the APP. This indicates that the APP
has now finished its founding phase and – like it was stated at the fifth PIC meeting in a
secretariat paper on the future of the APP – has transitioned fully into its implementation
phase. It has officially declared that it wants to move toward the next phase in its work.
Probably later this year the ministers meeting in China will follow, as decided earlier in New
Delhi.
The Partnership is open to enlargement by further interested and like-minded
countries in the future. All current partners are Asian-Pacific states and the APP is especially
important for this world region, but – despite its name – it is not limited to it. Therefore, other
countries – even European ones (which are not looking for it) – could be members as well,
but the current members will prove potential new partners seriously if they are really likeminded because the focus is on deepening the existing Partnership now more than on
enlargement. Canada was said to share the vision of the partners and having worked
constructively with all Partners before joining the Partnership officially. Nevertheless, several
countries have stated general interest in a membership, especially New Zealand and some
ASEAN states. Therefore, an 'APP-plus' with additional partners (which rumors predicted
already for late 2007) could become real in the near future. In the meantime, interested states
could use the – weaker – options of cooperation opened by the Partnership: They could work
with the partners in the Task Forces of the APP and take part in its projects and measures.
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3. Character and Aims
The APP is no international law treaty but forms a non-legally binding political 'soft law'
regime. This is stated expressively and indicated by terms like “compact” (instead of treaty),
“partners” (rather than parties), and “nations” (instead of states). Participation in the
Partnership is, therefore, on a totally voluntary basis which renders the existing ending clause
devoid of meaning. Each partner determines absolutely individually the nature of its
participation in APP activities. Consequently, individual verification and compliance control
– which are now key aspects in international law theory and practice – do not play any role in
the Partnership; only the general progress of it as a whole shall be assessed regularly to
ensure its effectiveness (to guarantee this, the Task Forces will report regularly about their
concrete activities to the PIC). However, while the Vision Statement uses the misleading
expression “non-binding”, the Charter prefers the more accurate term “non-legally binding”
which indicates clearly that the Partnership is meant to be politically binding. Having this in
mind, the APP should not be underestimated because, in the end, political obligations are
crucial even in international law that does not contain really effective enforcement.
The APP follows the ideal of sustainable development with interlinked environmental
(climate change, air pollution), economical (economic development and growth, energy
security) and social sub-aims (development, poverty eradication, safety, health, wellbeing).
Especially important are the aspects of climate change and energy security which are
connected for the first time that clearly in an international agreement – a link that has become
more familiar nowadays. Access to a diverse range of reliable and affordable energy sources
is seen as a major determinant of energy security by the APP. Partnership members recognize
that renewable energy and nuclear power will represent an increasing share of global energy
supply, but stress that fossil fuels underpin their economies now and for the predictable
future. The continued economic use of (cleaner) fossil fuels is consequently at the core of the
APP policy. Critics, therefore, view it as a 'coal pact' only. This is too simplistic but, without
doubt, the promising but still not completely economically available 'bridge technology' of
carbon capture and storage [CCS] is one of the central technological options for the APP.
4. Potential
Instead of reducing absolute greenhouse gas emissions, the APP only intends to limit the
“greenhouse gas intensities” of economic activities which would lead only to relative
emission reductions (compared to a reference case). This political plan presents a very
important difference from the 'cap and trade' architecture of the legally binding Kyoto
Protocol [KP] to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change [FCCC] with its general
aim of an absolute emission reduction commitment, and is much less ambitious than it. Even
in the best case scenario – a global use of the Partnership approach (with CCS) – absolute
greenhouse gas emissions would more or less double from now to 2050. Therefore, the
Partnership ideas are clearly not enough to respond sufficiently to climate change.
Nonetheless, they may play some role in dealing with this challenge.
The relative reduction of greenhouse gas emissions would differ between the world
regions and the economic sectors and the importance of CCS would vary between the sectors,
too. Therefore, it was absolutely reasonable to found sectoral-oriented APP Task Forces even
if there are no sectoral emission reduction commitments.
5. Purposes
The APP is meant to serve as a framework for international cooperation between its partners
– based on their respective competencies – and for the coordination of the national strategies
of the partners (with capacity-building). At its core, the Partnership is a political agreement
for the development and transfer of (existing and future) environmentally-sound technologies
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and practices. Economic freedom – with its legal and political aspects – is important for this
as an enabling environment (economic freedom leads to more energy efficiency which causes
less greenhouse gas emissions), so the Partnership contains an – yet little noticed –
institutional dimension as well. Therefore, it is – in addition to the existing and planned
national initiatives, of course – also an aim of the APP to promote (economic) freedom in
states like China and India as an enabling environment for technology transfer and climate
protection. The Task Forces are responsible for this promotion, too, but it is mainly a mission
for the PIC since this sensible topic requires a high-ranking political platform.
The technology cooperation of the APP builds on a great number of existing bi- and
multilateral political initiatives such as the G8 'Gleneagles Dialogue' and 'Plan of Action'
(2005), the 'Methane to Markets Partnership' (2004), the 'Carbon Sequestration Leadership
Forum' (2003), the 'International Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy' (2002), the 'Global
Gas Flaring Reduction Partnership' (2002), the 'Generation IV International Forum' (2001),
the 'Climate Technology Initiative' (1995), the 'Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme' (1991),
and the 'Clean Coal Centre' (1975). All these initiatives are, like the APP, non-legally binding
and often US-dominated 'parallel tracks' to the traditional UN climate treaty regime. As the
new Partnership APP is not limited in terms of particular technologies, it has the potential to
build up as a future framework for these initiatives which would strengthen enormously the
political relevance of the APP.
6. Intellectual Property and Financing
The technology affected by the APP cooperation is usually intellectual property of private
companies which explains why the private sector is so important for the Partnership. These
(big) companies normally have to be interested in profit and not that much in climate
protection – which leads to the question why so many of them participate in the APP and are
willing to share their knowledge. The answer is that it may be reasonable to cooperate in this
way if it prevents the states from other measures that are assessed as more dangerous for the
economic model and success of the companies. This is especially important for the energy
production industry from fossil fuels which is increasingly seen as environmentally very
problematic; here, CCS may be an option to maintain the general business model by taking
measures of climate protection and sharing them with companies in other states.
Nevertheless, there are various ways of protecting the intellectual property of companies in
different states. Having in mind these different national laws, all matters regarding
intellectual property are to be addressed case-by-case in the APP. The draft of the
'International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology' may give some advice here.
The crucial point for the Partnership will be the financing of the technology
development and transfer. The Vision Statement of the APP called for solid financial
arrangements, but the Charter only states that each partner may – at its discretion (and
subject to its laws, regulations, and policies) – contribute funds, personnel, and other
resources to the Partnership; any costs arising from APP activities are to be borne by the
partner that incurs them, unless other arrangements are made. As a result, the financial
contributions of the (developed) partners available so far are very limited, relatively vague,
and definitely not enough for the APP to have noteworthy success. For that reason, the
inclusion of the private sector is fundamental for the Partnership activities, or, as one APP
spokesman said: “The real dollars we are looking for are the private sector dollars; we are
talking tens of billions of dollars if not hundreds of billions of dollars. If we do not get the
investment sector we cannot succeed.” Currently, it does not look as though there will be
enough financial support for the Partnership to be particularly successful, even if most of the
presentations at the second, fourth and sixth PIC meeting dealt with the problem of
insufficient financing. The second Communiqué states that in the next phase of the APP work
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the partners will continue their efforts to locate additional financial resources.
7. Work Plans and Institutions
To come up to its purposes mentioned above, the APP will develop and implement Work
Plans. These programs are the heart of the APP. They follow a 'bottom-up' approach (which
differs from the more 'top-down' concept of the UN climate regime): They want to bring
together key actors and leaders of the private sector, research communities, governments, and
– if appropriate – also developing banks, intergovernmental and non-governmental
organizations. In Task Forces these actors shall develop sustainable solutions to the “shared
challenges”. Only these (future-orientated) challenges are mentioned, but not the (more pastorientated) concept of 'common but differentiated responsibilities' (that plays a very
important role in the traditional UN climate regime to justify dissimilar obligations between
developed and developing countries). The APP views itself as a genuine partnership of equals
based on mutual respect and cooperation.
The Vision Statement describes a wide field of – not concluding – sectors of
cooperation. In the short term these are energy efficiency, clean coal, integrated gasification
combined cycle, liquefied natural gas, CCS, combined heat and power, methane capture and
use, civilian nuclear power, geothermal, rural/village energy systems, advanced
transportation, building and home construction and operation, bioenergy, agriculture and
forestry, hydropower, wind power, solar power, and other renewables. Areas for mid- to
long-term cooperation may include, but not be limited to, hydrogen, nanotechnologies,
advanced biotechnologies, next-generation nuclear fission, and fusion energy. All these fields
describe technological measures for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions; geoengineering to cool down the atmosphere does not play a role in the APP even if this could be
integrated into its framework as well.
The APP focuses very much on fossil fuels as a short-term field of action. For that
reason, it is seen as critical to develop, demonstrate and implement promising cleaner and
lower emissions technologies that allow for the continued economic use of fossil fuels while
addressing air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, the first Work Plan of the
Partnership focuses on power generation and distribution, as well as key industries. It is seen
as a deficit that until now no Task Force deals with nuclear energy because the strengthened
use of it is promoted by APP governments and businesses; Australia – the main exporter of
uranium – is the only partner without own nuclear power plants.
Eight temporal public-private Task Forces have been established in addition to the
permanent political PIC and its Administrative Support Group [ASG]. The US government
serves initially as this secretariat (which indicates some dominance of it); each partner has to
designate an administrative liaison as a point of contact for the ASG. All decisions or
recommendations of the PIC or the Task Forces require consensus. The eight task forces
cover cleaner fossil energy (CFE), renewable energy and distributed generation (RDG),
power generation and transmission (PGT), steel (STF), aluminium (ATF), cement (CMT),
coal mining (CM), and buildings and appliances (BATF).
8. Action Plans
The range of projects and activities foreseen in the Action Plans developed by the Task
Forces are to be untertaken by the APP partners, but no partner has any legal obligation to
join in for a concrete project; nevertheless, there exists political pressure to collaborate with
the partners, of course. The Actions Plans are intended to identify ambitious and realistic
goals as well as specific opportunities for cooperation. Each Task Force has to formulate
detailed Action Plans outlining both immediate and medium-term specific actions, including
possible flagship projects and relevant indicators of progress. The yet existing eight Action
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Plans all contain a survey of the current technological situation of the sector, technology aims
and concrete measures, projects, and activities. They contain very different numbers and
types of concrete projects, but all of them include assessment, best practise, and capacity
building measures.
The Action Plans have been accepted by the PIC in late 2006, but lots of further
projects – also cross-cutting ones – have been added to the project roster later. All the
projects are described in detail at the APP homepage (www.asiapacificpartnership.org) –
where all APP documents are available – and it is impracticable to analyse them in the
context of this paper. The complete list of projects gives an impression of the wide range of
the Partnership activities. It shows that the APP analyses different technologies from diverse
sectors, but one has to have in mind that lot of these projects are in an early or middle stage
only and often their financing in the long run seems unsure. Some of the projects have been
cancelled in the meantime.
9. APP and UN Climate Regime
The possibility of an enlargement of the APP shows its potential competition for an important
role in international climate policy which is still dominated by the traditional UN climate
regime. The regime interplay of these two regimes can be described as a recipient regime (the
UN one) which is confronted with a new tributary regime (the APP one). A positioning,
therefore, could only be done by the newer regime, the APP. The Partnership does this
explicitly and differs between the FCCC and the KP: The purposes of the APP shall be and
remain “consistent with” the principles of the FCCC and be and remain intended to
“complement but not replace” the KP. The Partnership is, indeed, consistent with the –
relatively general – FCCC principles, but its position regarding the KP is much more dubious.
If it were to act as a complement, the APP must, like the KP, go beyond what is
embodied already in the FCCC which is the joint focal point of KP and APP. For that reason,
the technology development and transfer rules of the APP must go further than the
technology-orientated norms of the FCCC, especially its technology framework created by
the relevant decisions. This is not the case because the Partnership is only one of the
technological partnerships embodied already in the FCCC technology framework. To give an
example, the FCCC has an expert group on technology transfer which develops action and
work plans. To sum up, the APP does not have potential to complement the KP content.
So what are the exact intents of the APP – is the Partnership intended to replace the
KP instead? Some statements made by its representatives and also the timing of its meetings
– often a few months before the FCCC/KP meetings – indicate this. It seems likely that the
APP was set up as a competitive regime to the KP because the KP contains legally-binding
individual emission commitments which the APP states opposed (USA and Australia, which
did not ratify the KP by then) or did not favor for the future (China, India and Korea) at the
time of founding.
China, together with other developing countries, is not obliged to limit or reduce
greenhouse gases by the KP now, but it’s still strong economic development clearly leads to
greater pressure in this regard. Therefore, China has to argue for a right to further industrial
growth combined with a climate policy that is able to help reaching a (sustainable) ’peaceful
development’. It’s ’scientific outlook on development’ calls for conservation of energy and
resources, protection of the environment, stress on infrastructure, increase of economic
performance and identification of potential development. The APP may serve as one aspect in
China’s climate policy within the wider strategy of ’peaceful development’, together with the
KP, to which China is a party as well, of course.
The opposition towards the KP meant that the USA and Australia could not use the
flexible mechanisms of the KP which allow additional technology transfer to developing
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countries (clean development mechanism) and transformation states (joint implementation).
Therefore, for the USA and Australia, the APP was an alternative also in this regard, while
for the other – developing – partners it basically allowed even more technology transfer.
Japan simply widens its political options with a membership in both clubs. Overall then, the
APP was primarily intended to be an opposing model against the KP – so far, it was
constructed in many ways as a replacement of the KP.
The situation is a bit more complicated now. After the time of founding, Canada
joined the APP club (after stating that it will not meet its KP target and wants to focus more
on technological solutions), but Australia changed its position with the KP ratification of its
new government. By now, the APP definitely has to clarify, both internally and externally,
the role it wants to play in any international climate policy future.
As the APP is dominated by the USA, this probably will not happen before further
declarations of its new government, but President Barack Obama seems to be more interested
in an UN-dominated international climate policy than former President George W. Bush. His
concrete plans are not clear yet but he has started to be much more cooperative in the
processes leading to progress in the UN regime and he has invited 16 mayor economies to a
’Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate’ in April this year in Washington D.C. The
White House said in a statement this summit "will facilitate a candid dialogue among key
developed and developing countries, [and] help generate the political leadership necessary to
achieve a successful outcome at the UN climate change negotiations." This indicates some
difference to similar earlier talks organized by the Bush administration which had a focus on
progress outside the UN regime. Therefore, the APP could be less opposing to the KP than in
the past and much more complementary in the future.
The KP in its present form will expire in 2012. This leads to the question of whether
the APP could be integrated into the steadily developing traditional UN climate regime after
that. Because of some then probably still existing opposition towards the KP approach, such
integration is conceivable only under the FCCC framework. Since the creation of the APP,
the FCCC stressed its openness towards technology-orientated concepts, and the importance
of these were also mentioned – for example – at the G8 summits of Heiligendamm, Germany
(June 2007), and Toyako, Japan (July 2008). In addition to that, the processes hopefully
leading to progress in Copenhagen, Denmark, under the FCCC and the KP on ’Long-term
Cooperative Action’ and ’Further Commitments’ show a great openness for a much stronger
focus on technology as regards both mitigation and adaptation measures. This has been
shown – for example – in the first Bonn climate change negotiation session in March of this
year.
Nevertheless, a formal integration of the APP via a new technology protocol or a
second technology decision is very unlikely because the first option would lead to a legallybinding APP (against the declared will of its partners) and the – non-legally binding –
alternative would install parallel procedures and institutions to the existing FCCC technology
framework (which would undermine it against the will of the other FCCC parties). But
maybe the APP will influence the further development of this framework. As a result, in the
short run, only a non-formal integration is a realistic option which could lead to a fragmented
but synergic 'orchestra of treaties' with a fruitful cooperation between the traditional UN
climate regime and the APP. To avoid the destructive potential of the APP, a peaceful
coexistence with the traditional UN climate regime is necessary at least. It would be in
China's interest to argue for a stronger coexistence of the two regimes in international climate
policy.
Such a cooperation or coexistence is important because every technology-orientated
approach needs market incentives for the development and transfer of technology. It may be
an 'inconvenient truth', but these can be created only by external emission commitments (or
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other market mechanisms). Any international Post-2012 climate change regime has to deal
with the difficult task of combining the as yet competing approaches of market pull (KP) and
technology push (APP). Technology is an important – but only one – component in a
portfolio of measures against climate change. Integrating also climate change and energy
security concerns is especially important for Asia – with China in the center – as a region
with a strong economic growth and the APP is a forerunner in this. All this will be by far the
largest and hardest task that environmental policy has ever faced and very difficult for the
policymakers of the Post-2012 climate change regime, but, nonetheless, we should be
optimists like Sir Nicholas Stern, the economist who published a famous review report on
climate change: He imagines a “real festival of technology, fired by constantly stricter
commitments”.
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Figure: Institutions of the APP
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